Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) collapsed because fair value losses on its held-to-maturity portfolio rendered it insolvent and susceptible to a bank run. The nature of its depositor base (uninsured large depositors) ensured that any such bank run would lead to a swift death.
The collapse of SVB and the resulting contagion to other mid-market banks has led many to call for a blanket extension of deposit insurance to all deposits, irrespective of size. Instead of extending deposit insurance to all deposits, we need a "public option" for deposits where anyone can hold funds at the central bank and earn the risk-free rate, e.g. an interest-bearing CBDC (central bank digital currency)
If most individuals and corporations can hold their cash directly with the central bank, then that means that banks can no longer perform maturity transformation. However, maturity transformation is no longer needed today in a world where there is plenty of funding available from entities such as pension funds for longer-term assets (as I explain in these essays - https://www.macroresilience.com/2011/10/10/the-case-for-allowing-banks-to-fail/, https://www.macroresilience.com/2013/10/08/financing-investment-in-a-world-without-maturity-transformation/ and https://www.macroresilience.com/2010/10/21/questioning-the-benefits-of-maturity-transformation/)
In the absence of a public option for deposits, we should make it much easier than it currently is for individuals and corporates to hold their excess liquidity in short-term government bonds rather than bank deposits.
For any bank to be a viable privately owned economic entity, all elements of its capital structure need to earn a viable risk-adjusted return. If depositors are protected but equity investors are wiped out, and the banks are regulated to ensure they cannot take too much risk, the equity is uninvestable. This, of course, has been true for a long time. However, the widespread realisation of this fact will ensure the hasty realisation of the endgame, which is the nationalisation of banking as a sector.
"However, the widespread realisation of this fact will ensure the hasty realisation of the endgame, which is the nationalisation of banking as a sector."
Presumably given your references to P2P lending, allocation of risk capital will then be taken up by P2P and private options, including Bitcoin and other blockchain options?
That is, it is only the maturity transformation function of banking that remains in your nationalization scenario (though it may be very messy getting there)?