Why revolutions from within are so rare
on the difficulties faced when attempting revolutionary change
The most difficult problems that we face when we try to change a system’s fundamental nature from within are not technical. They are political and social. The fundamental problem is that it is incredibly hard to put together a team of people who can implement disruptive change. Those who know the system well enough to get things done and implement change without causing damage are insiders who not only have a vested interest in the status quo but genuinely believe that the system largely works for the good. On the other hand, outsiders who don’t have a vested interest and are not “captured” are too ignorant about the inner workings of the system to effectively get around the inevitable roadblocks put up by insiders or implement disruptive change without causing damage to the system.
This problem is especially insurmountable in the complex domains that are most dysfunctional today such as finance, healthcare, and defense. For example, reforming the National Health Service in the UK would require putting together a team of people who not only have detailed insider knowledge of how the system works but have no vested interest in maintaining the status quo. Such people are rare, perhaps even non-existent.
This is also why electing a new government/head of state or appointing a new CEO often makes no difference. The outsider President/Prime Minister/CEO either gets stonewalled and blocked by insiders or has to implement such draconian change (e.g. fire a large proportion of incumbents) that simply collapses the system. Collapse is typically something to be avoided but in extreme circumstances, collapse can also be the cure for dysfunctionality and systemic sclerosis.
But if collapse is something to be avoided at all costs then it becomes imperative not to implement change from within, but to grow new organisations and systems as Deng Xiaoping did. Although the Cultural Revolution, by decimating the incumbent interests present in China at the time, provided Deng with a relatively clean slate, he still had to deal with powerful resistance from the old guard. Deng solved this problem by constituting a separate and parallel chain of command and a completely new organisational structure. But even Deng only succeeded because China’s task wasn’t to replace or modernise an existing industrial base but to simply create a modern industrial base from scratch. The task is much harder when we need to transform an existing system.
So how do we solve this problem of finding the right people to enact a revolution? By ensuring that the new organisations and systems are not, in any shape or form, bound to replicate the inner workings of the incumbent organisation or even to inter-operate with the existing system. The new organisation must not even share the same regulatory structure/overseers. This ensures that no insider knowledge is needed within the new organisation. The new organisation may operate in a manner that is very different to the incumbent but this is a feature, not a bug. Duplication and even political infighting may reign for a while but this is a small price to pay for transformative change.